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Utah Statutes
U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4) & (4)(g)
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court.
Utah Case Authority
Grass Drilling Co. v. Board ofReview, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

Jensen v. Fountain Green, No 20030597-CA
Appellant's Reply Brief
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ARGUMENT
1. There is no issue of trial de novo.
The Appellee goes on at length regarding there being no right to a de novo hearing. This
entire argument is a red herring apparently designed to confuse the Court. Appellant's
Motion for Review states: "This Motion is based on the fact that the evidence before the
Administrative Law Judge does not support the Findings, and that at least one of the
findings is clearly erroneous." The plain language of the Motion for Review (Addendum,
Document No. 9) indicates that the evidence does not support the "findings" (plural),
then proceeds to address in detail one of those. Giving a detailed rebuttal of one fact does
not excuse the Labor Commission from considering the adequacy of evidence to support
all of the findings. Such consideration is not a de novo hearing.

2. Appellee is attempting to require Appellant to prove a negative, when the
Appellant's assignment or error is entirely consistent with the applicable statute.
When Appellee asserts that Appellant has failed to "marshal the facts,55 this is nothing
more than a bid to require her to prove a negative. The essence of the Appellant's claim
that the evidence does not support thefindingsis that there is a lack of substantial
evidence. This Court's review is conducted pursuant to U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4)(g), which
states that:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
Jensen v. Fountain Green, No. 20030597-CA
Appellant's Reply Brief
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prejudiced by any of the following:
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court.
U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4) & (4)(g)
Thus, the Appellant's assignment of error is not only proper, but tracks exactly the statute
dealing with relieffromthe actions of an administrative agency. That this statute has real
meaning is evident from Grass Drilling Co. v. Board ofReview, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). "This 'substantial evidence test5 grants appellate courts greater latitude in
reviewing the record than was previously granted under the Utah Employment Security
Act's 'any evidence of substance' test." Id. at pg. 67.
3. Although Appellee is correct in stating that the statute keeps the unemployment
decision from being binding, it may, and should have been, considered by the Labor
Commission and the Administrative Law Judge.
The citation by Appellee indicates what Appellant had missed, that the decision in the
unemployment case is not binding. However, it is a part of the Agency Record, and is
certainly highly relevant on the issue of whether there was a discharge for cause. At a
minimum, it should have been considered by the ALJ in rendering her decision, though
she could, admittedly, have chosen to find to the contrary. However, the record is devoid
of any indication that the ALJ so much as looked at the reasoned determination of a
coordinate agency. There is special significance in this because that decision was made
on an appeal which reversed the original determination. Common sense indicates that
Jensen v. Fountain Green, No 20030597-CA
Appellant's Reply Brief
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when another agency reversed a initial determination to make a ruling in favor of
Appellant, that determination should be carefully considered before a contrary
determination is made. That was not done in this case. This suggests strongly that the
Administrative Law Judge simply rubber stamped the city's decision without considering
all of the evidence in the record.
The Administrative Law Judge also failed to consider the inconsistency of Fountain
Green City's actions in this matter, first denying that they had terminated Appellant at all,
then changing their position to a claim that she was not a full-time employee, then
claiming that she wasfiredfor just cause.
CONCLUSION
The "whole record before the Court" indicates that the City of Fountain Green has
repeatedly changed their position to try to find something to excuse their actions. Even
the Administrative Law Judge found & prima facie case. The supposedly nondiscriminatory reason for the firing is not supported by "substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." This is evidentfromthe Labor
Commission's reversal on the full-time employee issue, the failure to so much as consider
an appeal decision in favor of Appellant on the termination for cause issue, and the city's
constantly changing legal positions throughout this action. Judgment should be entered in
her favor, with a subsequent hearing on damages.
DATED this 5th day of March, 2004
Jensen v. Labor Commission Court of Appeals No. 20030597-CA
Appellant's Brief
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ARGUMENT
Throughout thenr Appellant's Brief, Defendants once
aga in aft r — f • •- ^ - f i n e t-!»-, " v-t o+ t r e s p a s s " as
i n s t a l i a L ^ ' u wi i_.tiv, i,\ i.ii;,n:j in ti;-*_ J. ;/0s.
i ndeed the uar-t- nf trespass" of which Foxtail
D e f e n d a n t s ..--.. .. .,. : • - <• • -o 1:1. a

However,
action
but on

he
, i.s w e r e

comp] ai ns ,

i 1 1 11 1 ei 1: asse 1: t :i o 1 1 11: 1 a 1: Foxta:i 1

could not. maintain a cause of action for trespass

possession

f

both

of 1. he Land" at that i.imr-, \n<\ t :cause Foxtail 's

Foxtail has repeatedly

;i

explained

that its cause of

vi,t- i l l a t i o n o i t h e 1 it : ] ^ I L J ,

r. rot b a s e * • • » •

Defendants' tdiime to remove the uti^Lies, and

( i i ) Defendants' continued use of t:he ntil.it-.ies.
r ( . x 1 . i i i i. 1 : <•jxj_) I a i 11 < M 1 \

Moreover,
-hp^^s"

are a c t i o n a b l e u n d e r b o t h U t a h csise l a w a n d u n d e r t h e c o m m o n
] a/"ii \ :: f trespass

as 1: ef I ecte ::i :i 1 :i tl 1 B R astatemei it (Second)

Torts, and why these "acts of trespass" are not barred by
the statute of ] i m i t a t i o n s .

Similar !^

Defendant'~ havr-

f a i l e d t o c o n v i n c i n g l y a r g u e that thiL C o u r t s h o u i a d i s p e n s e
witb

t h ^ u s u a l rule r ^ ^ h - j n q

e s t a i - i u L a n easement

,.

absol nte 1 ini t • <^f title t o

.. - . ^1 J. .

F:i r.: . : y f b e c a u s e

Foxtail h a s not h a d a n o p p o r t u n i t y 1 0 present
relevai.

*qi iest f :: 3 : a

1

evidence
1Js

Court should not affirm the District Court's judgment on the

of

alternative ground that is not entitled to such relief.
POINT I. FOXTAIL HAS STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR TRESPASS.
Defendants contend that their refusal to re^move the
utilities cannot constitute a trespass because (i) the
installation of the utilities in the 1970s was not
"wrongful, " (ii) Defendants do not have a duty to remove the
utilities, and (iii) Defendants' continued use of the
utilities does not, "for all practical purposes'' cause water
to flow through Foxtail's property.

However, it is

primarily Defendants' failure to properly identify the "act
of trespass," not a correct legal analysis, that leads
Defendants to this conclusion.
The "acts of trespass" of which Foxtail complains are
(i) Defendants' failure to remove the utilities, and (ii)
Defendants' continued use of the utilities.

Foxtail has not

complained that the installation of the utilities in the
1970s was wrongful and has not sought redress on that basis.
Therefore, Defendants' contention that Foxtail cannot
maintain its cause of action based on the installation of
the utilities, while true, is nothing more than a diversion
and does not help this Court in its analysis.
Similarly, Defendants' argue that their refusal to
remove the utilities is not a trespass because they are
under no "duty" to do so.

See Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 158 (1965) (Trespass occurs when one "fails to remove from
2

the 1 and ~< thing which he \r

under a

H

'^ "^

remove.

making this argument, Defendants' agaiii ±^ok to th^ origin «i
installation of Hi^ Tit--M -it ifj; an th,j • •
su^:. . i..

: .*

...

]T

, .; y coi, , :

J

- isib^- basis 101

.., ..use .. : h^

ut i 1 i t ies were wronaf ul ^f. v placed upon Foxra 1 1 ' s nropertv. "

that the installation of

4

> n< -, ilitii-r wa. '<ot wrongful,
*-

Defend-c *

the installation, but as a i<-r:uif or thei : * aiian*

ui remove

the utilities after Foxtail revoked, the consent

-*:i

]

/

Foxtail's predecessors in interest *-^ maintain in. U L I J ,t-^rin t b^i r

rir

esent lo^at J ^n .

JocU'.;. e.

>

.-statement: vb\j_or ,

: _ u t s provides:

((
'
• Failure to Remove Thing Placed on Land
Pursu int t .. ]j i cense oi Other Pi. iv i leqe
A trespass may he o j>mmi t t «MJ i>\ \A\* t'.rj* m u e d
presence on the land oi a structuie, chattel, or
other thing which the actor or his predecessoi i n
legal i nterest has r l a r ^ ^^ + ,w" j ^ '
(a.) with the consent of tne person then ' :i
possession of the land, if the actor fails to
remove it after the consent ban be1 en effort ivrjlv
terminated,
K e s i a t einei i t

(Second)

Appellant'r;

R r i e f . ur

i n s t a 1 .i

.,..<_ •. i -

of

Tor t:s § II 60
\ 9 - 21

Defendants

.. : <

least until the yeai 20()o

(1965)

As e x p l a i n e d

had permi s s i o n

:i i l 11: I e i i: p r e s e n t
When th-e

utilities.
3

i n

to

1 oc at i o n a t

onsent was revoked, a

Defendants also ignore the fact that their continued
use of the utilities gives rise to a duty to remove them.
Foxtail has offered to remove the utilities at its own
expense if Defendants would stop using the utilities.

In

the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Foxtail's counsel stated:
Foxtail would be happy to remove the pipes and the
manhole cover at its own expense, as long as the
defendant was ordered to stop using that, because
we can't do it -- Foxtail can't do that, it's
public policy reasons, unless they stop using it
first.
R. 211 (p. 41). However, Defendants continue to use the
utilities and refuse to allow Foxtail to remove them, even
at its own expense.

Unless Defendants are willing to

abandon the utilities entirely and allow Foxtail to remove
the utilities itself, they have a duty to remove them.

They

cannot have it both ways.
Defendants cite U.P.C., Inc. v. R.Q.A. Gen'l, Inc., 990
P.2d 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) in support of their position
that Foxtail cannot maintain an action for trespass because
Defendants have no duty to remove the utilities.
however, is distinguishable.

That case,

In U.P.C., the defendant

refused to remove a billboard sign foundation from the
plaintiff's land upon the expiration of the defendant's
lease.

The lease was silent as to who, if anyone, had the

obligation to remove the foundation.

The Court held that in

such a case, where the respective duties of contracting
4

parties are reflected in a written agreement, the Cour t
would not

. .•

it.-jdo the contract, itself to impose an

additional duty on - ^^ *^

f

h ^ parties.

The Court stated,

* court may not m.^w <* setter contract for the parties
^. «t _*1 '

than they have made for tboniRplvpt
Tea r..

DL- A,, A /^i^cjctj. , 11 J<

v. 1 dines Corp. . 1

970 (Utah n . App . 1^88

contract

•• d case 01 contract
. ^ t "H ~ ^. ^ « ^

Finally
:. : •

,,

:. the instant -'ase. WL- have _io

installation, use, or removal or. tii-- t. ilities.
U_. P. *

-7110+- M V I

Because

' •
- n'^-H .

U. P . C . ' s ho i. < i 11 J ^ is no t. app i i cab 1 e

Defendants argue that th^ir "•ntinued use of

•_.„>. does not constitute:

;n^L,^ entry'' ^^

water onto or beneath the surface of Foxtai.:':'. property
r

f ••

ii. -

1

<i permanent- column • 1 w.«i<-:
the ea: : 1 y ] 970s "

"

.

v, IJ •!; ,as been present

i

since

Appe 1 ] e« *' 3 B1 : :i ef at III :! T1: 1 :i 3 <= L::I : g 1 lme 111

ignores the simple and undisputed facts that Defendants have
continue] 1,; »v-^^ «;bo utilities since thev were, installed and
that; Lih.... ;•—<_.,

. w. t,ipes today is not

was i .11 the. pipes th i rt-y years aqo .
dispi ited

:i,<- same water K:, :-

it cannot reasonable/ b e

-. • > .:-jt,_ii. .omtirnie to use L..UO

utilities, water continues? t

1 I w through them, entering

Defendants are also incorrect when they state that

5

their continued use of the utilities does "not cause Foxtail
any deprivation of its property that is separate and
distinct from the mere presence of the utilities
themselves."

Id.

As explained above, the only reason that

Foxtail cannot remove the utilities itself is because
Defendants continue to use them.

See

supra

p. 4.

Moreover,

as long as water is flowing through the utilities on
Foxtail's property, Foxtail risks a leak resulting in damage
to Foxtail's building or erosion of its soil.

These risks

would be eliminated if Defendants stopped using the
utilities.
POINT II. FOXTAIL'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Once again, Defendants argue that the installation
the

utilities,

of

if a trespass at all, must be characterized

as a permanent trespass which accrued for statute-oflimitation purposes at the time the utilities were installed
in the 1970s.

Once again, Defendants are correct in their

characterization of this uact of trespass" as a permanent
trespass and in their conclusion that any claim based only
on this "act of trespass" would be barred by the statute of
limitations.

Once again, however, Defendants ignore the two

"acts of trespass" identified by Foxtail as the bases for
its cause of action: i) Defendants' failure to remove the
utilities; and (ii) Defendants' continued use of the
utilities - both of which should be characterized as
6

continuing f~ r e s p a s s e s .
D e f e n d a n t s argue first that the installation of the
uHlitief-' :° analo-yi1/' to th^ dump" ; -H of debris in Breiggar
P r o p e r t i e s , L.C. v. H . E . Davis & Sons, Inc. , ^2
(Utah 2 0 0 ^ : . ,-,1-d M u !
. i i i . d ' j L . ^ i. ••<.,

i

P. ? d 11 *• '

h^ransp the dumping of debris was
i-:!*:i

• r e s p a s s , so should

installation oi th«* utilitif-n

:ie

However, the dumping oi

i n s t a l l a t i o n of the utilities is not t } i * - '\a <t of trespass"
ii 1 this c a s e .

f

f

W h e n I '! •

' r* •»>.

identified as either Defendants' failuje to remove the
u t i l i t e s or as D e f e n d a n t s ' continued u s ^ ^f the utilities it
b e c o m e s clear that t :he trespass is cent- L,i,i.iq in n a t u r e .
T h e Court in Breiggar recognized thattr espas..

. ,

•

< oonti inrrno

>

*--.'pasL

[giving iiae tci multiple causer; of action.

Jd

>l

*

in
v

:»:J vtiiy moment

utilities] ^i^r*-

i rial Defendants t a n
- << <•

i

[ t--iove ti.^-ii

- new cause of. action."

Simiicii

a^ Innq as D e t e n d a n t s ' continue to iise the u t i l i t i e s , *? T~•••
cause of a c t i o n accrues e v e r y time D e f e n d a n t s u s e their
water
D e f e n d a n t s cite two ( 'alifornia cases and OTIP
Pennsy I van i. i

^j ,!

'

•

: ]

-'•-'

•

an

encroachment effecting a permanent change ii i the condition

7

of the land is a permanent trespass.

See Appellee's Brief

at 18-20 (citing Castelletto v. Bendon, 13 Cal. Rptr. 907
(Cal. App. 1961); Bertram v. Orlando, 227 P.2d 894 (Cal.
App. 1951); Sustrik v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 197
A.2d 44 (Penn. 1964)).

While those cases may reflect the

law in those jurisdictions, they certainly do not reflect
the law in Utah or the position taken by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.

In Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339,

34 8 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that,
*[a] cause of action based upon encroachment is of the
nature of either a continuing trespass or a nuisance/'
Moreover, a comment to Section 160 of the Restatement,
specifically states:

e. Continuing

trespass.

The intentional

violation of such a duty of removal [arising out
of the revocation of consent] constitutes a
continuing trespass for the entire time during
which the actor is under a duty to remove the
thing, and gives to the possessor of the land a
series of independent causes of action for
trespass.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 160 cmt. e (1965).
also, 2 C.J.S. Adjoining

Landowners

§ 51 (2003)

See

("The

maintenance of an encroachment on the land may be a
continuing trespass, a nuisance, or both.").

Therefore,

despite Defendants' argument to the contrary, the clear
weight of authority and the position taken by the Utah
Supreme Court is that an encroachment such as the presence

8

of Defendants' utilities on Foxtail's property constitutes a
continuing tort.
Finally, Defendants argue that Hoary v. U.S., 64 P.3d
214 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) stands for the proposition that
the concept of continuing trespass does not apply whenever
the invasion of property rights is socially beneficial.
This is not what Hoary says.

The Court in Hoary first

explains the concepts of continuing trespass and continuing
nuisance and cites numerous cases indicating that they
remain viable concepts in Colorado.

See id. at 218-19

(citing Steiger v. Burroughs, 878 P.2d 131, 136 (Colo. App.
1994) (defendant's house remaining on plaintiff's property
constituted continuing trespass); Cobai v. Young, 679 P.2d
121, 123-24 (Colo. App. 1984) (snow sliding from defendant's
roof to plaintiff's house constituted continuing trespass);
Docheff v. City of Broomfield, 623 P.2d 69, 71 (Colo. App.
1980) (defendant's storm drainage system flooding
plaintiff's adjacent property constituted continuing
trespass).

The Court then goes on to recognize an exception

to the concept of continuing trespass which had been
established by Colorado courts in the early part of last
century.

This exception specifically applies to irrigation

ditches and railway lines because they "'represented a class
of enterprises
state.'"

A

so vital to the future development of our

Ixl. at 219 (quoting Middelkamp v. Bessemer
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Irrigating Ditch Co,, 103 P. 280, 284 (Colo. 1909)).
Ultimately, the Court in Hoary declined the Defendants'
invitation to extend this exception to the trespass at issue
in that case.

Hoary at 221-22.

In short, Hoary does not

does not support the Defendants' contention that any
socially beneficial property invasion must be characterized
as a permanent trespass.

Rather, Hoary stands for the

proposition that u[f]or continuing intrusions - either by
way of trespass or nuisance - each repetition or continuance
amounts to another wrong, giving rise to a new cause of
action" unless the intrusion is an irrigation ditch or a
railway line.

Id.,

at 218-220.

POINT III. DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE AN EASEMENT BY
IMPLICATION.
Defendants acknowledge the usual rule that an easement
by implication requires absolute unity of title.

However,

they ask this Court to carve out an exception to this rule
under the facts of this case.

See Appellee's Brief at 21.

In short, Defendants argue that because Foxtail was aware of
the location and use of the utilities at the time it
purchased the property, the element requiring absolute unity
of title should be eased to require only partial unity in
this case.

However, Defendants do not cite any case in

which any court from any jurisdiction has ever carved out
the exception they seek.

Instead, they point to some

general language in Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct.
10

App. 1989) in support of their argument and then they
misapply that language to the facts of this case.

Moreover,

Defendants utterly fail to address the rationale behind the
unity of title requirement and fail to explain why that
rationale should be set aside here.
In

Butler, this Court explained that an easement by

implication arises

xxx

as an inference of the intention of the

parties to a conveyance,'" rather than out of the express
language of the conveyance.

Icl. at 1153 (quoting Adamson v.

Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264, 270 (1947).

The Court spelled out

the specific elements of such an easement and held that when
these elements are present, it is presumed that "the parties
contracted with a view to the condition of the property as
it actually was at the time of the transaction."

_Id. at

1152-53.
Defendants rely upon this language in arguing that
because Foxtail knew about the utilities at the time it
purchased its property, only partial unity of title should
be required.

However, Defendants' reliance upon this

language is misplaced and its argument is illogical.

First,

the "transaction" referred to in Butler is the transaction
in which the unity of title was severed - not the
transaction in which the present owner purchased its
property.

Second, there is no logical connection between

Foxtail's purchase and the creation of an easement by

11

implication.

An easement by implication is created at the

time unity of title is severed.

A subsequent transaction

cannot cause an easement by implication to be created or
defeated.

Defendants' argument is simply illogical.

Moreover, Defendants have not countered Foxtail's
argument in its Appellant's Brief at 29-31 that the absolute
unity of title requirement is supported by a strong policy
rationale.

This policy was summarized in Farley v. Howard,

70 N.Y.S. 51, aff'd 65 NE 1116 (App. Div. 1901) as follows:
[The] rule [requiring absolute unity of title]
necessarily involves the proposition that the man
creating the easement is the absolute owner of
both lots, and has, therefore, the right to put
upon either any incumbrance he likes. Quite
clearly the rule fails in this case. Howard was
the absolute owner of 32 only. As to 34 he owned
but a one-half interest. While he could do what
he pleased with his undivided one-half interest in
that lot, he could not impose upon Dumond's onehalf interest any burden whatever.
Id. at 53.

Similarly, the common owners of the Victoria

Canyon and Elizabeth House properties at the time of
development collectively owned only a one-half interest in
the Elizabeth House property.

The other one-half interest

was owned by Elizabeth Drinkhaus, who had no ownership
interest at all in the Victoria Canyon property.
197.

R. 120,

Absent an explicit agreement to the contrary (of which

there is no evidence in the record), those common owners
could not impose any burden whatsoever on Drinkhaus'
interest in the Elizabeth House.

12

In sum, Defendants have failed to demonstrate why this
Court should deviate from its rule that an easement will not
be upheld unless "the clear weight of the evidence supports
each of the elements necessary to constitute an easement by
implication."

Butler at 1152.

POINT IV. DEFENDANTS7 ARGUMENT THAT FOXTAIL IS NOT
ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS PREMATURE AND
THEIR CLAIM THAT FOXTAIL IS NOT ENTITLED TO
DAMAGES IS INCORRECT.
Defendants contend that the District Court's judgment
should be affirmed because Foxtail is not entitled to the
injunctive relief it requested in its Complaint.
Appellee's Brief at 26-29.

See

However, because Foxtail has not

had an opportunity to present evidence in support of its
prayer for injunctive relief nor has the District Court had
an opportunity to evaluate such evidence, Defendants'
argument is premature.
Trial courts have discretion in determining whether to
grant injunctive relief or award damages to an aggrieved
party.

Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165, 170 (Utah Ct. App.

1993) . Utah courts follow a ''balance of injury" test to
determine which remedy to award.

Id.

Under that test, an equity court may exercise its
discretion not to grant injunctive relief when the
plaintiff is not irreparably harmed by the
violation, the violation was innocent, defendants7
cost of removal would be disproportionate and
oppressive compared to the benefits plaintiffs
would derive from it, and plaintiffs can be
compensated by damages.
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Id. at 170-71 (quoting Crimmons v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478,
480 (Utah 1981) .

In order to properly apply this test,

trial courts must consider evidence presented by the parties
relevant to the factors set forth in the test.

See id. at

171; See also Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Utah
Ct• App. 198 7) .

"Where a court's ruling on a motion for an

injunction is based on its consideration of the evidence
presented in light of relevant legal factors, the grant or
denial of injunctive relief rests within the discretion of
the trial court."

Hunsaker v. Kersh, 991 P.2d 67, 69 (Utah

1999) .
In the instant case, Foxtail has not had an opportunity
to present any evidence in support of its request for an
injunction.

Before a court can rule on the issuance of an

injunction, Foxtail must have an opportunity to present
evidence of the harm it will suffer if the Defendants are
allowed to continue to use the utilities in their present
location.

Specifically, Foxtail would want to present

evidence of (i) the risk of damage to Foxtail's building or
land caused by a potential water leak; (ii) the impact the
utilities have on the rental value of Foxtail's apartments
(an unsightly manhole cover now sits in the middle of
Foxtail's lawn); and (iii) the impact the utilities have on
the resale value of Foxtail's property.

Moreover,

Defendants must present evidence of the harm and
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inconvenience they would suffer if required to move the
utilities.

None of this evidence was presented to the

District Court and the District Court never made any
decision with respect to Foxtail's request for an
injunction.
If this Court does evaluate Foxtail's request for an
injunction, even in the absence of the necessary evidence in
the record, Foxtail believes it would be entitled to an
injunction under the rationale of Hatanaka, 738 P.2d 1052.
In that case, the plaintiff brought suit against his
neighbor seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the
neighbor to remove a fence, dirt, and debris the neighbor
had placed on the plaintiff's property but in an area where
the location of the property line was in dispute.

After a

thorough consideration of the evidence presented, the trial
court delineated the boundary and concluded that the
neighbor was "trespassing on plaintiff's property when [he]
constructed the fence and deposited the dirt and debris."
Id. at 1054.

The trial court went on to grant the

injunction ordering the neighbor to remove the fence, dirt,
and debris, and also permanently enjoining the neighbor from
doing similar future acts on the plaintiff's property.

Id.

On appeal, this Court upheld the injunction, even though it
specifically noted that the neighbor's conduct was not
willful or malicious.

Id. In other words, even an innocent
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trespasser (such as Defendants in the instant case) can be
subjected to the burden of injunctive relief, as Foxtail has
requested.
Finally, Defendants contend that Foxtail would not be
entitled to compensatory daimages caused by the alleged
trespass.

First, Defendants fail to recognize that the

District Court could award damages even though Foxtail did
not specifically request an award of damages in its
Complaint.

Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides, in relevant part:
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is
entered by default, every final judgment shall
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has

not demanded such relief

in his

pleadings.

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1) (emphasis added).
Second, Defendants are not correct when they state that
there is "no basis for an award of money damages."
Appellee's Brief at 26.

One measure of damages for trespass

is the diminution in value of the property caused by the
encroachment.

Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972

P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998) .

Of course, Foxtail would have

to present evidence, such as the expert testimony of an
commercial property appraiser, to support its claim that its
property is worth less with the utilities and manhole cover
than it would be if they were removed.

However, Foxtail has

not had an opportunity to present such evidence yet.
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Another possible measure of damages is the loss of rental
value of Foxtail's apartments caused by the presence of the
utilities on Foxtail's property.

Although this type of loss

might be difficult to measure, Foxtail should be given an
opportunity to present the necessary evidence.1
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the District Court's
decision should be reversed and this case should be remanded
for further consideration of Foxtail's claim consistent with
the positions set forth in Foxtail's briefs,
SUBMITTED this April 22, 2004.

DavM S. K o t q l e r
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

1

As an aside, the difficulty in ascertaining damages
provides an additional reason for the trial court to issue
the requested injunction. See Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist.
v. Spanish Fork, 918 P.2d 870, 881 (Utah 1996) (injunction
is appropriate where *[m]onetary damages would be difficult
and perhaps impossible to ascertain, and [the business]
would be forced to bring continuing and successive lawsuits
for damages."); see also Hunsaker v. Kersh, 991 P.2d 67, 70
(Utah Ct. App. 1999) ("Loss of business and goodwill may
constitute irreparable harm susceptible to injunction.").
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